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Abstract
A range of defense methods have been proposed to improve
the robustness of neural networks on adversarial examples,
among which provable defense methods have been demon-
strated to be effective to train neural networks that are cer-
tifiably robust to the attacker. However, most of these prov-
able defense methods treat all examples equally during train-
ing process, which ignore the inconsistent constraint of certi-
fied robustness between correctly classified (natural) and mis-
classified examples. In this paper, we explore this inconsis-
tency caused by misclassified examples and add a novel con-
sistency regularization term to make better use of the mis-
classified examples. Specifically, we identified that the cer-
tified robustness of network can be significantly improved
if the constraint of certified robustness on misclassified ex-
amples and correctly classified examples is consistent. Mo-
tivated by this discovery, we design a new defense regular-
ization term called Misclassification Aware Adversarial Reg-
ularization (MAAR), which constrains the output probability
distributions of all examples in the certified region of the mis-
classified example. Experimental results show that our pro-
posed MAAR achieves the best certified robustness and com-
parable accuracy on CIFAR-10 and MNIST datasets in com-
parison with several state-of-the-art methods.
Introduction
Despite the widespread success of neural network on diverse
tasks such as image classification (Krizhevsky, Sutskever,
and Hinton 2012), face and speech recognition (Taigman
et al. 2014; Hinton et al. 2012). Recent studies have high-
lighted the lack of robustness in state-of-the-art neural net-
work models, e.g., a visually imperceptible adversarial im-
age can be easily crafted to mislead a well-trained net-
work (Szegedy et al. 2014; Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2015). The vulnerability to adversarial examples calls into
question the safety-critical applications and services de-
ployed by neural networks, including autonomous driving
systems and malware detection protocols.
Considering the significance of adversarial robustness
in neural network, a range of defense methods have been
proposed. Adversarial training (Goodfellow, Shlens, and
Szegedy 2015; Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016)
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Figure 1: Illustration about the inconsistent constraints
of certified robustness between correctly classified and
misclassified examples. As shown in the second row,
ADV(·,Y) loss on misclassified examples will keep the
original accuracy instead of certified robustness while cor-
rectly classified examples keep the original accuracy as well
as certified robustness as shown in the first row. This will
lead the output probability distributions of all examples in
the certified region of the misclassified examples to be un-
stable.
trains neural networks on adversarial examples are highly
robust against the strongest known adversarial attacks such
as C&W attack (Carlini and Wagner 2017), but it provides
no guarantee — it is unable to produce a certificate that there
are no possible adversarial attack which could potentially
break the model. To address this lack of guarantees, recent
line of work on provable defense (Wong and Kolter 2018;
Raghunathan, Steinhardt, and Liang 2018; Mirman, Gehr,
and Vechev 2018; Cohen, Rosenfeld, and Kolter 2019) has
proposed to train neural networks that no attacks within a
certain region will alter the networks prediction. Moreover,
recent work (Balunovic and Vechev 2020) combines adver-
sarial training and provable defense methods to train neural
network with both high certified robustness and accuracy.
However, recall that the formal definition of certified ro-
bustness is conditioned on natural examples that are cor-
rectly classified (Balunovic and Vechev 2020; Wong and
Kolter 2018). Most provable defense methods treat equally
in both correctly classified and misclassified examples dur-
ing training process while evaluating certified robustness
just on correctly classified examples. From this perspec-































Figure 2: Verified error (red lines) and original accuracy
(blue lines) for COLT (Balunovic and Vechev 2020) and
Misclassification Aware Training (MAT). The dataset is
CIFAR-10 with L∞ maximum perturbation ε = 2/255.
tive, the effect of misclassified example on certified robust-
ness is unknown. Therefore, it is not clear for the following
questions: (1) Do misclassified examples have effectiveness
for improving certified robustness? (2) If yes, how can we
make better use of misclassified examples to improve the
certified robustness of neural network ?
In this paper, we investigate this significant aspect of cer-
tified robustness, and find that the misclassified examples do
have excellent influence on the certified robustness. To val-
idate this discovery, we conduct a proof-of-concept exper-
iment on CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, Hinton et al. 2009) with
L∞ maximum perturbation ε = 2/255 based on convex lay-
erwise adversarial training (COLT) (Balunovic and Vechev
2020).
Different from COLT, which searches the potential adver-
sarial examples on all natural examples within the convex
relaxation region for adversarial training layerwisely, we dy-
namically select two subsets of natural training examples to
investigate: 1) a subset of correctly classified examples C+
and 2) a subset of misclassified examples C−. Using these
two subsets, we explore different loss functions to re-train
the same network hθ, and evaluate its original accuracy and
verified error (The details of these metrics are in Appendix
A.4) during the training process. Specifically, let X be nat-
ural input of the network with {C+, C− ∈ X} and Y be its
corresponding ground-truth label. hθ(X ) is denoted as cor-
responding output label produced by the network. First, let’s
consider the traditional adversarial risk in COLT model:
COLT : ADV([C+]′,Y) +ADV([C−]′,Y) (1)
where ADV(·) is the adversarial training loss function,
[C+]′, [C−]′ are adversarial examples produced by C+ and
C− within the perturbation sets, respectively. As shown in
the first part ADV([C+]′,Y) in Equation (1), the objec-
tives of robustness constraint and original accuracy con-
straint are the same for correctly classified examples: Con-
straining the correctly classified examples C+ and all exam-
ples within their perturbations sets [C+]′ to be close enough
to the correct labels Y . However, for misclassified exam-
ples, the constraints on robustness and accuracy in the sec-
ond part ADV([C−]′,Y) are different: Making the misclas-
sified examples C− and the examples in the perturbation set
[C−]′ close enough to the original labels Y will improve
the original accuracy of the network, but it is undeniable
that this will destroy the stability of the misclassified exam-
ples (the original label is the “wrong label” for misclassi-
fied example), thereby reducing the certified robustness of
the network. Based on the above observation, we find the
constraints of certified robustness between correctly classi-
fied and misclassified examples are inconsistent, as shown
in Figure 1. To deal with this problem, we firstly propose to
use the output label (the output label is the “true label” for
misclassified example) of the misclassified example during
training process to keep the stability of misclassified exam-
ples. The adversarial risk is described as follows, which we
call Misclassification Aware Training (MAT):
MAT : ADV([C+]′,Y) +ADV([C−]′, hθ(C−)) (2)
where hθ(C−) denotes the output label corresponding to the
input C−.
Interestingly, we find it that the misclassified examples
have a significant effect on the final certified robustness of
network (shown in Figure 2). Compared with COLT (dashed
red line), the verified error of MAT (red line) drops drasti-
cally. However, the original accuracy of MAT (blue line) is
extremely lower than standard COLT (dashed blue line).
In this paper, in order to make better use of misclassified
examples, we propose a consistency regularization to con-
strain the output probability distributions of all examples in
the certified region of the misclassified example. The regu-
larization term called Misclassification Aware Adversarial
Regularization (MAAR) aims to encourage the output of
network to be stable against misclassified adversarial exam-
ples. In other words, MAAR focuses on solving the incon-
sistency of certified robustness on correctly classified and
misclassified examples, which improves the final certified
robustness of network. Meanwhile, MAAR does not change
the training label during the training process, which allevi-
ates the decrease of model accuracy.
Our main contributions are:
• We investigate the inconsistency on constraint of cer-
tified robustness caused by misclassified examples by
a proof-of-concept experiment (i.e., Misclassification
Aware Training (MAT)).
• We propose a consistency regularization called Mis-
classification Aware Adversarial Regularization (MAAR)
which improves certified robustness by maintaining the
stability of misclassified examples as well as relieving the
degree of accuracy decline.
• We show the effectiveness of MAAR by different net-
works and perturbations on two datasets. Specifically,
MAAR achieves the state-of-the-art certified robustness
of 62.8% on CIFAR-10 with 2/255 L∞ perturbations
on 4-layer convolutional network as well as 97.3% on




Base Classifier. For a K-class (K ≥ 2) classification
problem, denote a dataset {(xi, yi)}i=1,··· ,n with distribu-
tion xi ∈ Rd as natural input and yi ∈ {1, · · · ,K} rep-
resents its corresponding true label, a classifier hθ with pa-
rameter θ predicts the class of an input example xi:







where zk(xi,θ) is the logits output of the network with re-
spect to class k, and pk(xi,θ) is the probability (softmax on
logits) of xi belonging to class k.
Adversarial Risk. The adversarial risk (Madry et al.
2017) on dataset {(xi, yi)}i=1,··· ,n and classifier hθ output
probability p(x) can be defined as follows:







where L is the loss function such as commonly used cross
entropy loss, and Bε(xi) = {x : ||x − xi||p ≤ ε} denotes
the Lp-norm ball centered at xi with radius ε. We will focus
on the L∞-ball in this paper.
Original Training Risk in COLT. The original training
risk in COLT (Balunovic and Vechev 2020) is defined as
follows:
RCOLT (hθ,xi) := Lori(p(xi), yi) +ADV(p(x′i), yi)
(6)
where Lori(·) is the original training loss function such as
cross entropy loss and x′i ∈ Bε(xi).
Misclassification Aware Adversarial Regularization
To differentiate and explore the effect of misclassified exam-
ples, we reformulate the training risk based on the prediction
of the current network hθ. Specifically, we split the natural
training examples into two subset according to hθ, with one
subset of correctly classified examples (C+hθ ) and one subset
of misclassified examples (C−hθ ):
C+hθ = {i : i ∈ [n], hθ(xi) = yi} (7)
C−hθ = {i : i ∈ [n], hθ(xi) 6= yi} (8)
With the purpose of avoiding excessive reduction of the
original accuracy as well as keeping the consistency of cer-
tified robustness on two subsets, we regularize misclassi-
fied examples by an additional term (a KL-divergence term
that was used previously in (Wang et al. 2019; Zhang et al.
2019b; Zheng et al. 2016)) rather than changing the training
labels. The proposed regularization term aims to constrain
the output probability distributions of all examples in the
certified region of the misclassified example, thus improv-
ing the certified robustness of network. The improved train-
ing risk of misclassified examples is formulated as follows:











measures the difference of two distributions.
For correctly classified examples, we simply use original
training risk, i.e.,
R+(hθ,xi) := Lori(p(xi), yi) +ADV(p(x′i), yi) (11)
Finally, by combining the two training risk terms (i.e.,
Equation (9) and Equation (11)), we train a network that
















{Lori(p(xi), yi) +ADV(p(x′i), yi)
+KL(p(xi)||p(x′i)) · I(hθ(xi) 6= yi)}
(12)
where I(hθ(xi) 6= yi) is the indicator function. I(hθ(xi) 6=
yi) = 1 if hθ(xi) 6= yi, and I(hθ(xi) 6= yi) = 0 otherwise.
Optimization for Regularization Term. As pre-
sented in Equation (12), the new training risk is a




i=1{KL(p(xi)||p(x′i)) · I(hθ(xi) 6= yi)}. However,
the indicator function cannot be directly optimized if we
conduct a hard decision during the training process. In this
study, we propose to use a soft decision scheme by replacing
I(hθ(xi) 6= yi) with the output probability 1 − pyi(xi,θ).
The output probability will be large for misclassified
examples and small for correctly classified examples, by
which we could provide a approximate solution for 0-1
optimization problem .
The Overall Objective. Based on the regularization opti-
mization, the objective function of our proposed Misclassi-







where LMAAR(xi, yi,θ) is defined as:
LMAAR(xi, yi,θ) = Lori(p(xi), yi) +ADV(p(x′i), yi)
+ λ · KL(p(xi)||p(x′i)) · (1− pyi(xi,θ))
(14)
Here, λ are tunable scaling paremeters and fixed for all train-
ing examples. The sensitivity of λ is described in Appendix
C.1. For more details on the training procedure, see Ap-
pendix A.
Table 1: Comparison with the state-of-the-art methods. Accuracy and certified robustness evaluated with L∞ perturbation 2/255
and 8/255 on CIFAR-10 dataset, L∞ perturbation 0.1 on MNIST dataset. ACC: Accuracy, CR: Certified robustness.
Method
CIFAR-10 MNIST
ε = 2/255 ε = 8/255 ε = 0.1
ACC(%) CR(%) ACC(%) CR(%) ACC(%) CR(%)
Our work(MAAR) 77.7 62.8 47.6 29.8 99.1 97.3
COLT (2020) 80.0 58.6 51.3 26.7 99.2 97.1
CROWN-IBP (2019a) 61.6 48.6 48.5 26.3 98.7 96.6
IBP (2018) 58.0 47.8 47.8 24.9 98.8 95.8
Xiao et al.(2018) 61.1 45.9 40.5 20.3 99.0 95.6
Mirman et al.(2019) 62.3 45.5 46.2 27.2 98.7 96.8
Results



























Figure 3: Certified robustness of COLT and MAAR with dif-
ferent perturbations.
Certification under Different Perturbations.
We evaluate the effectiveness of MAAR on certified robust-
ness with different perturbations. As shown in Figure 3,
the certified robustness of MAAR (orange bar) is obviously
higher than COLT (blue bar) during different perturbations.
Specifically, MAAR achieves the state-of-the-art certified
robustness (i.e., 62.8%) compared with COLT (59.6%) when
ε = 2/255. We also show the effectiveness of MAAR dur-
ing laywise training process in Appendix C.2. What’s more,
further experimental results show that our MAAR achieves
better certified robustness (62.8%) when comparision with
giving all examples the same weight (60.8%).
Comparison with Prior Work.
We compare our MAAR with COLT (Balunovic and Vechev
2020), CROWN-IBP (Zhang et al. 2019a), IBP (Gowal et al.
2018) in the same network architecture, parameter settings,
and certification progress. We also list the results reported
in literature of Xiao et al.(2018) and Mirman et al.(2019)
in Table 1. The network sizes and training parameters on
two datasets (i.e., CIFAR-10 and MNIST) can be found in
Appendix B.
CIFAR-10. For the L∞ perturbation 2/255. Experiment
results show that MAAR substantially outperforms its com-
petitors by certified robustness (i.e., 62.8%). Besides, the ac-
curacy of our method also outperforms other works except
COLT. This is because one side-effect of our regularization
is that it will maintain the distribution around misclassified
examples, which will decrease the accuracy in comparison
with COLT. Actually, the accuracy–robustness trade-off has
been proved to exist in predictive models when training ro-
bust models (Tsipras et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2019b).
We also run the same experiment for L∞ perturbation
8/255. When under the same experimental settings, MAAR
also achieves the best certified robustness (i.e., 29.8%). Here
we do not compare with the certified robustness (i.e., 32,0%)
reported in literature of IBP (Gowal et al. 2018) as their re-
sults were found to be not reproducible (Mirman, Singh, and
Vechev 2019; Zhang et al. 2019a).
MNIST. To futher evaluate the effectiveness of our
method, we also conduct experiments on MNIST dataset
with L∞ perturbation 0.1. We report the full results in Ta-
ble 1, MAAR also achieve the state-of-the-art certified ro-
bustness (i.e., 97.3%) comparable with best results from
prior work (i.e., 97.1%).
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the inconsistent constraint of
certified robustness between correctly classified and mis-
classified and find that misclassified examples have a rec-
ognizable impact on the final certified robustness of net-
work. Based on this observation, we designed a consistency
regularization term which constrains the output probabil-
ity distributions of examples in the certified region of the
misclassified example. Our method, named Misclassifica-
tion Aware Adversarial Regularization (MAAR), achieves
the state-of-the-art certified robustness of 62.8% on CIFAR-
10 with 2/255 L∞ perturbation as well as 97.3% on MNIST
dataset with L∞ perturbation 0.1. The method is general and
can be instantiated with most of training risk.
In the future, we plan to investigate the association be-
tween accuracy and certified robustness among different
neural networks, and apply our method to more provable de-
fense frameworks.
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Appendix A. Algorithmic Details
A.1 MAAR Algorithmic
Algorithm 1 Misclassification Aware Adversarial Regularization (MAAR)
Input d-layer network hθ, training set (X ,Y), learning rate η, step size α, inner steps n, tunable scaling parameters λ,
perturbation ε.
for l ≤ d do
for j ≤ nepochs do
Sample mini-batch:
(x1, y1), (x2, y2) · · · , (xb, yb)} ∼ (X ,Y);
Compute convex relaxations: Cl(x1), · · · ,Cl(xb);
Initialize: x′1 ∼ Cl(x1), · · · ,x′b ∼ Cl(xb);
for i ≤ b do
Update in parallel n times:






L(hl+1:dθ (x′i), yi)← Lori(p(xi), yi) +ADV(p(x′i), yi) + λ · KL(p(xi)||p(x′i)) · (1− pyi(xi,θ))
Update parameters:








Freeze parameters θl+1 of layer function hl+1θ .
end for
Output Certified robust neural network hθ
A.2 Training
The layerwise training (Balunovic and Vechev 2020) has been adopted in our MAAR’s training. Compared with standard
adversarial training in (Madry et al. 2017), layerwise training not only performs adversarial attack on the input domain, but also
searches potential adversarial examples in the hidden layer of the convex perturbation region. It will freeze the previous layers
and stop back-propagation after the update of the current layer.
Each convex region of layer i is represented as a set Ci(x) = {ai +Aie|e ∈ [−1, 1]mi} (Wong and Kolter 2018), vector ai
represents the center of the set and the matrix Ai represents the affine transformation of the hypercube [−1, 1]mi . Propagation
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where Wi+1 and bi+1 are the weights matrix and bias matrix of layer i + 1, respectively. xl = max(0,x − ε) and xu =
min(1,x + ε), ε is the L∞ radius which we are certifying, [·]denotes concatenation of matrics along the column dimension.
Specifically, we first compute lower bound li and upper bound ui in the set Ci(x):
li = ai − |Ai| (17)
ui = ai + |Ai| (18)
Then, we need to compute ||Ai||1, which is the L1 norm ofAi. According to Equation (16), we can get:
Ai = [WiΛi−1Wi−2Λi−3 · · ·M0, · · · ,WiΛi−1Wi−2Mi−3,WiMi−1] (19)
We use Cauchy random projections to efficiently estimate ||Ai||1 (Wong and Kolter 2018). The method of random projections
samples standard Cauchy random matrixR and splitR = [R0,R2, · · · ,Ri−1] and compute:
AiR = WiΛi−1Wi−2Λi−3 · · ·M0R0 +WiΛi−1Wi−2Mi−3Ri−3 +WiMi−1Ri−1 (20)
Finally, we estimates ||Ai||1 ≈ median(|AiR|) and compute li,ui.
Based on these calculations, we search the adversarial examples in layer i as follows:
en ← clip(en + αATi ∇xn′ADV(xn′, yn),−1, 1) (21)
xn′ ← al +Alen (22)
where n is the iteration steps, clip(·) is function which thresholds its argument between -1 and 1.
A.3 Certification
After training completes, we perform certification which is the same as (Balunovic and Vechev 2020) as follows: for every
image, we first try to certify it using only linear relaxations. If this fails, we encode the last layer as MILP and try again. Finally,
if this fails we encode the ReLU activation after the last convolution using additional up to 50 binary variables and the rest using
the triangle formulation (Ehlers 2017). We consider an image to be not certifiable if we fail to certify it using these methods.
We always certify the full test set of 10 000 images. The overall verfied pipeline is listed in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Verfied Pipeline for Provably Robust Certification: robust(xi)
Input d-layer network hθ, testing sample xi, perturbation ε.
if hθ(xi) 6= yi then {##misclassified}
verfied fails; continue
end if
if xi : PGD ATTACK success then
verfied fails; continue
end if
if xi :DIFFAI-v3 verfied then {##source code: https://github.com/eth-sri/diffai}
verfied success; continue
end if
Perform MILP solver to test xi layerwisely as follow. {##source code: https://github.com/eth-sri/colt}
for li : ALL RELU Layers do
if MILP Solver for xi in layer #li fails then
ENCODER RELU layer #li using additional up to 50 binary variables.
end if
end for
if MILP Solver for xi success in last layer then
verfied success
end if
Output Verfied or Not Verfied
A.4 Evaluation Metrics
We use four metrics to evaluate our training models: original accuracy, certified robustness, verified error, and latent robustness.
Original accuracy denotes the fraction of a testing set on which a model is correct. It is the standard accuracy metric used to
evaluate any DNN, defended or not. Certified robustness denotes the fraction of the testing set on which a certified model
predictions are both correct and certified robust for a given prediction robustness threshold. It has become a standard metric
to evaluate models trained with certified defenses (Wong and Kolter 2018; Raghunathan, Steinhardt, and Liang 2018). By
considering the time consuming for calculating certified robustness during the training process, we define verified error to
evaluate the robustness of network in training process. Verified error denotes the fraction of the training set on which the
correctly classified examples become to adversarial examples, which is computationally tractable. Latent robustness denotes
the fraction of the testing set on which a model predictions are both correct and robust against latent adversarial attacks on a
certain layer. Mathematically, the metrics are defined as follows:
• Original Accuracy (ACC): ∑n
i=1 I(hθ(xi) = yi)
n
(23)
where I(hθ(xi) = yi) denotes a function that will return 1 if the prediction on one testing example xi returns the correct
label yi, and 0 otherwise.
• Certified Robustness (CR): ∑n
i=1 I(robust(xi))&(hθ(xi) = yi))
n
(24)
where robust(xi) represents the network output is certifiable robust to input xi (according to Appendix A.3), I(·) is a indictor
function.
• Verified Error (VE): ∑n
i=1 I((hθ(x′i) 6= yi)&(hθ(xi) = yi))∑n
i=1 I(hθ(xi) = yi)
(25)
where x′i ∈ Bε(xi), I(·) is a indictor function.





i) = yi)&(hθ(xi) = yi))
n
(26)
where x′i ∈ Bε(xi), I(·) is a indictor function, hd
th
θ (·) denotes that latent adversarial attack is performed on d-th layer of the
network.
Appendix B. Network Sizes and Training Parameters
We perform all experiments on a desktop PC using a single GeForce RTX 2080 Ti GPU and 12-core Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8700
CPU @ 3.20GHz. We implemented training and certification in PyTorch and used Gurobi 9.0 as a MILP solver.
B.1 CIFAR-10
The network architecture used for CIFAR-10 is a 4-layer convolutional network: first 3 layers are convolutional layers with filter
sizes 32, 32, 128, kernel sizes 3, 3, 4 and strides 1, 2, 2, respectively. Convolutional layers are followed by a fully connected
layer consisting of 250 hidden units. After each layer there is a ReLU activation. Final layer is a fully connected layer with 10
output neurons. The model is trained using SGD with momentum 0.9, the initial learning rate is 0.03 and after the initial 60
epochs we multiply the learning rate by 0.5 every 10 epochs. We use 8 steps during the latent adversarial attack and each step
size is 0.25 (where perturbations are normalized between -1 and 1). We perform MAAR in 4 stages (i.e., the first convolutional
layer (Stage #1), the second convolutional layer (Stage #2), the third convolutional layer (Stage #3), and the fully connected
layer (Stage #4)), for 200 epochs per stage, for a total of 800 epochs.
B.2 MNIST
For MNIST, we use a 3-layer convolutional network: 2 convolutional layers with kernel sizes 5 and 4, and strides 2 followed by
1 fully connected layer consisting of 100 hidden units. Each of the layers is followed by a ReLU activation function. We use 40
steps for the latent adversarial attack with step size 0.035. We train using Adam (Kingma and Ba 2014) with initial learning rate
0.0001 and after the initial 100 epochs we multiply the learning rate by 0.5 every 10 epochs. We perform MAAR on MNIST in
4 stages (i.e., the first convolutional layer (Stage #1), the second convolutional layer (Stage #2), and the fully connected layer
(Stage #3)), for 300 epochs per stage, for a total of 900 epochs.
Appendix C. Additional Results
C.1 Sensitivity of Regularization Parameter λ
































Figure 4: The network achieves different certified robustness and accuracy across different choices of regularization parameter
λ.









































Figure 5: Layerwise verified error (a) and layerwise original accuracy (b) of COLT, MAT and our proposed MAAR on different
stages. The 4-stage network is trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset with L∞ perturbation 2/255.
We investigate the parameter λ with MAAR defined in Equation (14) which controls the contribution of the regularization
term. We present the results in Figure 4 for different λ ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}. By explicitly setting different impact parameter of
misclassified examples, the network achieves good stability and robustness across different choices of λ. According to the
experimental results, we choose λ = 6 for our experiments.
C.2 The Effectiveness of MAAR
Comparison with COLT and MAT. In order to verify the effectiveness of our proposed MAAR, we firstly compare MAAR
with COLT and MAT. Note that all experiment settings of these three methods are the same instead of the constraint on
misclassified examples. The verified error and original accuracy evaluated at every epoch during training process has been
shown in Figure 5.
As shown in Figure 5(a), the verified error of MAAR (green line) decreases more rapidly in comparison with COLT (red line)
during each stage, which indicates that MAAR can reduce the proportion of potential adversarial examples in each layer. On
the other hand, MAAR maintains the stability of misclassified examples by an additional regularization constraint rather than
replacing the training label as MAT, which mitigate the decrease of original accuracy. As shown in Figure 5(b), the accuracy of
MAAR (green line) is obviously improved when compared with MAT (blue line).
Table 2: The final certified robustness (CR) and latent robustness (LR) of network trained on MAAR and COLT with the
parameters of different stages. LR3
rd




Stage #1 MAAR (Our work) 54.1 58.3COLT (2020) 40.0 47.5
Stage #2 MAAR (Our work) 57.5 60.1COLT (2020) 48.2 54.5
Stage #3 MAAR (Our work) 60.7 62.0COLT (2020) 57.7 60.8
Stage #4 MAAR (Our work) 62.8 64.7COLT (2020) 59.6 62.1
The Consistent Promotion of MAAR in Layerwise Training Mechanism. In addition, we evaluate the final certified ro-
bustness of the network on the checkpoint saved after each stage’s training. As shown in Table 2, we can observe that the final
certified robustness of our network has been significantly improved in layerwise training fashion (from 54.1% on Stage #1 to
62.8% on Stage #4). Furthermore, the final certified robustness of our proposed MAAR is obviously higher than COLT when
evaluated on all stages. Meanwhile, we investigate the latent robustness (LR) of the model. Generally, we run latent adversarial
attack (i.e., PGD attack with 150 steps and step size of 0.01) on 3-rd ReLU layer with parameters of each stage. Table 2 indicates
the LR of our proposed MAAR improves from 58.3% on Stage #1 to 64.7% on Stage #4, which is also obviously outperforming
COLT on all stages. These results demonstrate that MAAR can bring the consistent promotion in layerwise training.
